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REFORMING THE PAY SYSTEM FOR GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEES IN EGYPT 
Doha Abdelhamid and Laila El Baradei 
ABSTRACT 
This article attempts to identify what needs to be done to reform the pay system for 
government employees in Egypt through proposing a set of policy solutions and 
strategies. After dissecting the structure and composition of the current pay system, and 
conducting structured interviews with a sample of Egyptian government employees to 
solicit their views about the adequacy of pay, the authors propose a system for pay 
adjustment and strategies to resolve the problem. Foremost among these issues are 
securing the needed extra funding for increasing government employees’ pay, right-
sizing the government civil service, enhancing transparency, reducing wage 
discrepancies, reforming the minimum wage policy and establishing a better link 
between pay and performance. To conclude, the study stresses that the urgency of the 
problem requires the Government of Egypt to consider pay reform a top priority and 




To be effective, a public sector pay system needs to satisfy the needs of both employer 
and employees. The employer, in this case the government, looks for ease of 
administration, flexibility and affordability. Meanwhile, the employees look for 
adequacy in meeting living expenses, and to fairness in relation to other employees and 
to market rates. 
 
In Egypt, public employees’ pay system is laden with problems. Among these problems 
are low salaries and wages, which are set way below market rates; the impact of these 
low salaries on the level of motivation of employees and on the ability of government 
organizations to attract the required skills; the overly complex nature of the pay system; 
the general ambiguity regarding the actual allowances obtained; and more importantly, 
the huge burden the current compensation system represents on the state budget. 
 
The purpose of this research is to try to identify what needs to be done to reform the 
Egyptian government employees’ pay system through proposing a concrete set of 
feasible policy solutions and strategies. Targeted comprehensive reform is one that will 
lead to the realization of an effective public employees’ pay system that satisfies the 
needs of both employer and employees, and will have positive long-term impacts on 
productivity, efficiency, performance of the public employees and consequently the 
effectiveness and responsiveness of the Egyptian bureaucracy. 
 
In order to meet this target, attempts to find clear-cut answers for the following 
questions will be investigated in the course of research: What are the most salient 
features of Egypt's government sector employees' pay system? And how do government 
employees perceive their compensation system? How can an acceptable formula be 
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constructed for adjusting government employees’ pay? And what are the critical issues 
that need to be addressed in reforming the public employees’ pay system? 
 
To answer the research questions, the study will (i) provide an analytical and 
investigative overview of the features of the current public sector employees pay system 
including, inter alia, governing rules, regulations, policies, pay scales, inflationary 
trends, allowances, incentives and bonuses; (ii) perform a limited, structured survey 
covering the various pay categories at the Central Agency for Organization and 
Administration (CAOA) and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) in order to 
solicit perceptions and opinions on reforming the current pay system in government; 
(iii) develop a system to adjust government employees’ pay rationally while keeping in 
mind basic needs, price level, and decent living; and (iv) conclude with policy-oriented 
findings and recommendations to enrich the ongoing public debate on government pay 
system within an overarching framework of civil service reform. 
 
Organizationally, the study is divided into seven main sections. After the introduction, 
Section two deals with the theoretical and conceptual framework of pay system reform. 
Section three discusses the main features of the Egyptian government employees pay 
system. Section four conducts an analysis of Egyptian government employees’ 
perceptions of the pay problem. Section five proposes a salary adjustment structure for 
Egyptian employees’ pay. Section six presents a mix of critical strategic issues and 
strategies for pay reform in Egypt. Section seven concludes. 
 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This section discusses the complexity of the pay reform problem, the pay reform goals 
aspired to by any nation, and the diverse approaches and techniques theoretically 
available for making pay decisions and implementing reform. 
 
Complexity of the problem 
Developing countries face difficulties in reforming the pay system due to contradictory 
stakeholders’ objectives and other political, economic and managerial aspects. 
Examples of such complexities (Kiragu and Mukandala 2003, 1-7; Mutahaba 2005, 4; 
Cardona 2007) include: 
- Political considerations, which tend to influence government decisions of pay 
system reform as much as, or even more than, economic considerations. 
National political leaders may sometimes seek to win votes, especially during 
elections, by deciding to raise the salaries of low-paid employees in the 
government bureaucracy.  
- Labor unions and syndicates may ask for pay raises—especially for unskilled 
and semi-skilled labor—that may exceed ongoing market rates, and may end up 
being unaffordable to the government.  
- Governments of developing countries suffering a deficit in fiscal resources and 
wishing to control or reduce the wage bill sometimes face a serious challenge in 
realizing that an improvement in the delivery of public services may require an 
increase in public employment. For example, in the education sector to improve 
the quality of education there is often a real need for appointment of more 
teachers and improving the teacher/student ratios in schools.  
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- Poor compensation of government employees is directly related to many 
negative phenomena in the government administration, including—but not 
limited to—feeble productivity, weakened commitment to the public service, 
corruption, absenteeism, pursuit of alternative employment, reduced 
accountability, and inability of the government to attract the needed qualified 
and competent candidates, especially for its leadership positions.  
- Valuing civil service pay is complicated because oftentimes the outputs 
produced by civil servants are not marketable (public goods) or are natural 
monopolies.  
- Donor agencies may sometimes be willing to help by providing support to 
developing countries to cover and raise their wage bill, but national governments 
often refuse to resort to such measures for fear of creating aid dependency.  
- Pay is not the only factor influencing government employees’ performance, but 
other socio-cultural factors may be more influential and have to be taken into 
consideration.  
 
Diversity of approaches, techniques and models used in pay reform 
Approaches and techniques used by developing countries in reforming and adjusting 
their pay systems vary widely. They range from setting a national incomes and 
employment policy for both the public and private sectors, to allowing for collective 
bargaining with trade unions, to automatic adjustment of salaries by agencies in charge 
(Kiragu and Mukandala 2003, 18-27). 
 
Three main models of pay adjustment and reform were identified: the crisis driven 
model, the political model and the rational model. As for the crisis driven model, it is 
the case when the government does not have a proactive policy in tackling pay 
decisions, but rather reacts most of the time to pressures and comes up with ad hoc 
temporary solutions to emerging problems. It offers favorable treatment to the more 
powerful groups of employees. 
 
As for the political model, the essence is that pay decisions affect different groups in 
society differently and that pay decisions should serve some political objectives. There 
are three variations on this model. The first is the centralized control option, where the 
central government decides on a unified salary structure, index for salary adjustments 
and minimum wage policy. Second is the consensus building option through organizing 
discussions with stakeholder groups and implementing successive salary reviews. The 
third is the egalitarian option where the main concern is achieving equity and fairness 
in the allocation of the wage bill. 
 
In the third model, which is the rational model, it is believed that the only way to 
achieve an efficient and effective solution to the public service pay system is to de-
politicize it. Three options exist for implementing the rational model including the 
affordability option, the skills market competitiveness option and the performance-
based option. The affordability option starts by setting a wage bill ceiling and tries to 
find the appropriate matching wage scale and public service size. As for the skills 
market competitiveness option, it focuses on the need to recruit and retain adequate 
numbers of personnel with critical skills and experience through setting their salary 
levels to be comparable with market rates. Finally, the performance based option tries to 
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link performance to pay, and although seemingly logical, it is difficult to implement, 
and faces a great deal of resistance from labor unions and syndicates (Kiragu and 
Mukandala 2003, 27-31). 
 
Egypt seems to be adopting most of the time a weak version of the rational approach 
coupled with a crisis driven approach, where adjustments of basic salary do not meet, 
and are actually de-linked from the real increases in cost of living expenses. It is also 
related to the crisis driven approach as happened on May 1
st
 2008, when the President 
decided on a 30 percent increase rather than the usual 10-20 percent in an attempt to 
appease workers and public sector employees and contribute in some way to controlling 
the rising rates of demonstrations and strikes over the past year. The crisis driven 
approach is also evident in the recently agreed “special cadres” status for public school 
teachers and the in-kind and financial allowances and bonuses decreed provisionally to 
some public enterprise sector workers, like in El Mehalla textile company, and not to 
others, because they were more vocal in expressing their discontent and asked for their 
labor rights in a manner caught by the press and civil society organizations. 
 
MAIN FEATURES OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES’ PAY 
SYSTEM 
The following section aims at explaining the status quo of the current Egyptian 
government employees’ pay system, including the complicated legislative background 
governing the system and a brief sketch of this system and its developments, the signs 
of rising dissatisfaction with the system, the current minimum wage policy, effective 
average wage of government employees and the size and age structure of the Egyptian 
bureaucracy. 
 
Legislative grounds and sketch of the governing system 
As a signatory to the International Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the 
International Convention for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Egypt is 
required to safeguard the right of citizens to fair and adequate pay, securing decent 
living and sufficient social protection upon employment and unemployment. In 
addition, under the International Labor Convention (1970) minimum wages are to be 
established and regularly updated within the rule of law. Moreover, Islamic 
jurisprudence dictates that an employee should get his payment upon rendering the 
services and/or goods contracted. 
Currently, there are more than 40 different laws and regulations and no less than 55 
decrees regulating the government employees’ pay system. The web of allowances is a 
clear indication of its complexity. The main features of this pay system are as follows: 
- Minimum salary in government and public sector has been set at LE 35 per 
month in 1984 and stayed as such since then.  
- In 1986, it was stipulated that any government employee’s salary should not 
exceed LE 20,000 per year (LE 1667 per month). This was raised in 2000 to LE 
54,000 per annum (LE 4500 per month).  
- A series of special added and un-added bonuses, annual increases and various 
incentives introduced in 1987 to date burden the system as shown in Table 1. 
Laws stipulate that no insurance payments are due over un-added bonuses on 
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both the side of the employer and employee. This reduces the government fiscal 
burden and increases employees' disposable income. At the same time, it defers 
the problematic issue of securing a decent pension payment to pensioners upon 
retirement. This leads to an actuarial mismatch on the sides of the government 
and its employees contributions and hence on future pension liabilities. 
- The National Council for Wages (NCW) was established by Law 12 for 2003 
with the mandate to ensure that salaries (implicitly for the government, non-
government and private sectors) should be in tandem with the cost of living.  
- The president, vice president and ministers are not considered civil servants and 
their salaries are governed by special laws.  
- Government employees are allowed to hold other paid jobs with permission.  
 
One more feature of the complexity of the Egyptian pay system is the series of special 
bonuses, annual increases, differing allowances and incentive structures. A closer look 
at Table 1 illustrates that the lower bound entry salary for a civil servant at grade 6 is LE 
35 per month in 2008, yet in-hand salary after adding a series of added and un-added 
bonuses and incentives reaches LE 289 per month. The range of salaries at the lower 
bound, as depicted in the table, is narrow. The salary of a first undersecretary does not 
reach fivefold that of a new entrant to the government without a university degree 
(grade 6) and fourfold that of a new university graduate (grade 3), thus providing little 
incentive for advancement. It is worth noting as well that authors' interviews (2008) 
have shown that government employees are yet to collect incentives that range between 
300-950 percent of their salaries for the same grade although in different administrative 
units of government. 
 
Some additional observations were also drawn. First, there is a correlation between the 
increase in the percentage of special bonuses and their years of addition to basic 
salaries, on the one hand, and presidential election years, on the other hand. To 
illustrate, it was found that a 20 percent special bonus in 1987 was added in 1992 (a 
year after elections); a 20 percent special bonus in 1991 was added in 1997 (a year after 
elections); a 20 percent special bonus in 2006 (election year) to be added in 2011 
(election year); and a 15 percent special bonus is to be added in 2012 (a year after 
elections). Second, although so far 200 percent of basic salary increases have been 
added during the period 1987-2008 with additional 95 percent expected to be added by 
2013, the presidential elections program in 2006 promised a 100 percent increase in pay 
by 2011 (the upcoming election year). Until FY 2008/09, a 55 percent increase in pay 
has been fulfilled leaving a 45 percent increase for the following three years. However, 
in spite of these increases, the question remains whether civil servants' basic salary in 
FY 2008/09 is sufficient to cover rising prices, sustain a decent quality of life for 
government employees and is adjustable periodically based on economic principles. 
 
Growing dissatisfaction with current pay in government sector 
Over the past couple of years, Egypt witnessed an unprecedented increase in the number 
of demonstrations and labor strikes in various parts of the government’s administration 
and public sector organizations calling for a change in their compensation and pay 
system. While the Ministry of Manpower and Migration affirms that strikes and sit-ins 
were resolved amicably, independent human rights activist organizations, such as 
Human Rights Watch and others, allege that resolutions came as a result of repressions. 
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At any rate, official versus independent figures on labor demonstrations, strikes and sit-
ins demonstrate an unchecked area by the government and domestic civil society. 
Regardless of the numbers, the overall public impression is that there is a general 
heightened level of dissatisfaction, especially of public employees and workers, with the 
pay level, which mostly falls under the national poverty line. 
 
Minimum wage policy and real wage 
Turning again to Egyptian laws, it was found that a minimum wage is guaranteed for all 
government and non-government employees, in addition to yearly increments to salary 
ranging usually between 10-20 percent since 1978; the only exception being the 30 
percent increment decided on May 1
st
, 2008. The policy has been criticized due to a 
number of reasons. 
 
First, deterioration has occurred in real pay over the years without acceptable 
adjustments as per international good practice. When minimum wage is related to per 
capita GNP, it appears that this rate has decreased from nearly 60 percent in 1984 to 
19.4 percent in 1991/92 and further to 13 percent in 2007. Second, when the ratio of 
minimum wage to per capita GNP is compared to other countries, it appears amongst 
the lowest. While in Turkey the rate is 78 percent, France 51 percent, Spain 26 percent, 
in Egypt it is only 13 percent. Third, when compared to the upper poverty line in some 
other countries, we find in Egypt, with a value of 0.05 percent of the upper poverty line, 
it is amongst the lowest rates; in Argentina it is 1.32 percent, in Mexico 2.02 percent, 
while in the Philippines it is 1.55 percent. Fourth, despite the fact that the legally 
binding minimum wage equals LE 35/month, yet there is a huge discrepancy between 
what is stated in the law and what the employees actually receive as minimum wage 
(Metwally 2008). The actual minimum wage received by government employees from 
the category of ‘supporting staff’ employed on job grade six currently exceeds by 
eightfold the nominal minimum wage (LE 289 versus LE 35). Those who occupy this 
grade represent only around 3 percent of the total number of government employees 
(Radwan 2008, 5). 
 
Thus, there is a real need to modify the minimum wage policy in Egypt and therefore 
the entire grade scales. Although the National Council for Wages was supposed to come 
up with a revision for minimum wages in Egypt, it has not managed to do so until today. 
However, several experts have come up with proposals for how to adjust minimum 
wage in Egypt. According to Radwan (2008, 9), a range of LE 250-300, as a national 
minimum wage allowing for differences based on educational level and degree, would 
be the practical solution that can be implemented right away. Radwan did not explain 
the basis upon which the said figures were proposed. Alternatively, according to El-
Tagamou opposition party (2008), and based on a study of living expenses for a basket 
of basic goods and services required for a family of four individuals in July 2007 
(Abdel-Khalek 2008), the party recommended LE 912 per month as a national 
minimum wage. The upper bound specified by the Tagamou Party’s study stood at LE 
9,000 per month. Both proposed upper and lower bounds were said to be subject to cost-
of-living adjustments as of the start of FY 2008/09 (i.e., 01/07/08) with adjustments 
thereafter. The study proposed funding the wage raises through setting minimum 
corporate taxes to 25 percent progressive up to a ceiling of 30 percent to ensure 
equitable income distribution in the national economy. In addition, the study proposed 
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that maximum earnings of a government employee should not exceed by10-folds the 
prevailing minimum wage at any point in time as per international good practice 
(Abdel-Khalek 2008; interview 2008). 
 
According to Helmy (2008), the minimum wage should not fall below LE 660 so as to 
exceed the national poverty line and based on the going dependency rate in Egypt in 
2008. According to El Gebali (2008), rather than specifying an exact figure, minimum 
wage should be raised to be compatible with inflation rates and workers’ productivity 
and at the same time allow for differences between sectors and geographic areas. 
International experience has proven that those latter measures are somewhat difficult to 
implement. Since the presidential 30 percent special bonus announced in May 2008, 
policy dialogue on government employees’ wage and salary reviews halted with 
skepticism looming as to whether or not the government and the National Council for 
Wages will work on reviewing the wage/salary schedule for government employees in 
the upcoming period. 
 
Effective average wage of government employees 
There is no clear and consistent mechanism which informs the public on the effective 
market price of government employees in various sectors of the economy and vis-à-vis 
the private sector. The two most recent studies in this domain were conducted by 
CAOA (2008a) and Radwan (2008). 
 
The CAOA study used CAPMAS Employment, Wages and Work Hours Bulletin to 
stress that government employees were generously paid compared to private sector 
employees. To illustrate, average government and public authorities pay stood at LE 
257 per month in 2005 higher than average private sector pay, which was LE 168 per 
month. In addition, the study pointed to the similarities and dissimilarities in average 
"economic sector pay" in the government and private sector. For example, CAOA found 
that average pay for government and private sector employees in both the 
manufacturing, and building and construction sectors was LE 247 per month and LE 
236 per month, respectively. Average pay in the financial intermediaries sector in the 
government versus the private sector showed discrepancies. Average pay of government 
employees in the finance sector was LE 317 per month, while in the private sector a 
financial specialist earned LE 514 per month. The study did not go beyond listing those 
figures.  
 
Alternatively, Radwan (2008) cited some of the CAOA study findings and elaborated 
on the government wage differentials paid by public authorities and holding companies 
operating in different economic sectors. A deeper look at Table 2 in FY 2005/06 reveals 
that the lowest government-paying sector of activity was commerce at LE 806 per 
month, while the highest was the metallurgical industry at LE 2,055 per month, with 
total average of LE 1,281 per month for public authorities considered in various sectors. 
Although Radwan did not address the public-private wage differentials, similar to 
CAOA, it is obvious that the results of both studies for the same year (FY 2005/06) 
show a striking contrast on government average pay as well as for sectoral pay. 
 
A study by El-Essawi (2007, 525-6) showed a downward trend in real wages in both the 
public and private sectors. El-Essawi notes that by 1999/2000 real wages and the 
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standard of living for Egypt's salaried employees have lost almost the level that was 
achieved in 1981/82 for the private sector and in 1976/77 for the public sector. 
Cumulated inflation since 1999 has substantially eroded whatever was remaining of real 
wages. Despite its alarming results, El-Essawi’s study seems to be the only government 
employees’ real wage discovery analysis, though it was not sectorally disaggregated. 
 
In general, there does not seem to be a periodic, aggregated or disaggregated 
mechanism for the Egyptian economy upon which wages are adjusted (i.e., real, 
nominal pay, average and/or sectoral pay for government vs. private sector). This 
questions the legitimacy of the basis upon which annual decisions are taken by the 
National Council for Wages and other authorities for salary increases if the government 
lacks a comprehensive, updated database on salaries and compensations in the economy 
that would lead to informed decisions accordingly. The weakness of the negotiating 
power of the labor movement and syndicates in the country may be a cause for not 
bringing the issue of tracking and updating such information and mechanisms to the 
forefront of civil service reforms in Egypt despite the growing dissatisfaction with 
wages. 
 
All in all, Egypt’s government pay system is elusive and insufficient to cover rising 
prices and to sustain a decent quality of life for government employees. Furthermore, it 
does not follow logic beyond the mechanical salary schedule contained in Law no. 47 
for 1978, and the five-year rolling basis annual social allowance additions, which again 
lacks an explicit rationale for its incremental percentage depiction. 
 
Size of the Bureaucracy 
Egypt is characterized by a relatively large bureaucracy, as reflected by the number of 
civil servants per 1000 citizens compared to a number of countries (Table 3). The total 
size of Egyptian bureaucracy is estimated at around 5.7 million employees. 
 
This raises the issue of rightsizing the Egyptian bureaucracy. Despite the deteriorating 
real value of wages in the government sector, government jobs are still in high demand, 
mainly because of the non-pecuniary benefits associated with such jobs (Assaad 1997). 
Moreover, Egypt’s civil service is an outlier in terms of number, but not in terms of 
wage bill size when gauged against countries with a comparable level of income and 
economic structure such as Syria and Iran (World Bank 2008). 
 
PERCEPTION OF EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
To further understand the scope and dimensions of the pay problem in Egypt, opinions 
of a sample of government employees were solicited regarding the currently applicable 
Egyptian pay system. Structured interviews were held with 100 government employees 
to investigate their degree of satisfaction with the current pay system, to what extent it 
suffices their basic needs, what they do to make ends meet, their perceptions regarding 
the recent pay increases and their opinions about possible options for reform. 
 
Once the questionnaire for the structured interviews was prepared, it was pilot tested on 
a group of employees at the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) and a set of 
modifications were introduced to clarify the questions. One of the eye-opening remarks 
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obtained was regarding the engagement in ‘gameyat’, or informal monthly installment 
collection arrangements for the purpose of saving. The feedback from the initial group 
on which the questionnaire was tried was that they participate in ‘gameyat’ to be able to 
repay their debt liabilities, but not for the purpose of saving. Accordingly, the term 
‘saving’ was omitted from the perception checklist. 
 
The sample selected for the structured interviews was purposive quota sampling rather 
than random. Since the topic is a very sensitive one and employees are generally 
reluctant to engage in discussions regarding their personal management of financial 
affairs, the interviews were conducted in two traditional government organizations 
where the researchers have access and connections and the respondents were somewhat 
cooperative, although still with a certain noticeable degree of reservation.  
 
Respondents’ reluctance to cooperate was noted on several occasions. One example 
being when several of the interviewees first conceded to their having outside jobs but 
then after second thoughts decided not to mention such an issue in the interview, 
refused to specify the type of job and asked the interviewer to cross out any reference to 
it from the interview notes. The two government organizations selected for the conduct 
of the interviews were the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Central Agency for 
Organization and Administration (CAOA) at the Cabinet of Ministers. The selected 100 
interviewees reflected as much as possible diverse employment status, different job 
grades, age groups, gender, number of work years, social status, and number of 
dependents. Interviews were conducted with 50 employees in each organization; the 
authors decided it was a suitable limit for the number of interviews since no new 
insights were obtained beyond that point. Table 4 shows the distribution of the sample 
of interviewees among the different variables noted above. 
 
Overall, although the results obtained from the structured interviews cannot be 
generalized or assumed applicable to the 5.7 million Egyptian government employees, 
yet they can be used as possible indications for general trends within the Egyptian 
government’s bureaucracy. They are to a great extent in conformance with previous 
results mentioned in the literature. They provide good and concrete examples of detailed 
aspects of the employees’ management of their financial affairs. 
 
Main findings from empirical study 
Reasons for working in government 
On asking respondents about the incentives for which they chose to work in a 
government organization, interestingly the topmost reason mentioned by 30 percent of 
the respondents was that it provides them with a sense of ‘security and stability’. The 
second reason mentioned was that there was‘conformity between their educational 
degree and the current job requirements’ (20 percent). Other reasons mentioned were 
that in a government job there are ‘better working hours’ (10.9 percent), ‘possibility of 
promotion’ (8.6 percent), ‘prestige and social status’ (8.2 percent), ‘wages, benefits and 
incentives’ (8.2 percent), ‘proximity to place of residence’ (5.9 percent), ‘availability of 
social services’ (such as healthcare and transportation services) (5.9 percent), and 
finally that the government job provides them with the ‘option of taking on a second 
job’ (2.3 percent). 
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A gender-based classification of responses has demonstrated divergences with respect to 
the reasons for which government employment was selected. While female employees 
gave more weight to ‘better working hours’ (13 percent for females and 7 percent for 
males) and to ‘proximity to place of residence’ (9 percent for females and 3 percent for 
males), male employees rated higher ‘security and stability’ as family bread winners (34 
percent for males and 27 percent for females), for ‘possibility of promotion’ (10 percent 
for males and 7 percent for females) and for the ‘option of taking on a second job’ (4 
percent for males and 1 percent for females). 
 
Among the employees who mentioned the ‘option of taking on a second job’ as one of 
the reasons for choosing to work in the government, the majority (60 percent) occupied 
positions in the second grade of the government’s system of job classification, that is to 
say, mid-career employees. 
 
It is clear that people working for the government are not doing this because of pay. It 
represents only 8 percent of the total weight relative to other reasons for working in a 
government organization. They understand that it is not the best pay available in the 
market but they give more tilt to the security and stability associated with the 
government job than anything else. 
 
Satisfaction with total pay received 
Total monthly pay is defined as the average amount received per month of basic salary, 
incentives, bonuses and allowances. Employees interviewed were asked about whether 
they were satisfied with several aspects related to their total monthly pay and they were 
asked to rate their level of satisfaction on a scale of 4 points ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, 
‘to a certain extent disagree’ and ‘disagree’. 
Overall, it appeared that 82 percent of respondents are not satisfied, at varying degrees, 
with their monthly pay and 97 percent think that their total monthly pay is not 
compatible with the market value of wages and salaries. 
 
Satisfaction with bonuses and incentives 
On asking respondents about their satisfaction with bonuses and incentives, 75 percent 
of respondents do not think that bonuses and incentives are distributed according to 
clear and well determined criteria; 76 percent do not think there is fairness in the 
distribution of incentives, and 98 percent do not think that yearly bonuses and salary 
increases are compatible with the inflation rates and rising prices, and 87 percent are not 
satisfied with the latest social increases to wages authorized by the President in May 
2008. 
Pay sufficiency to workers and their household needs 
On asking respondents whether they were capable of saving a portion of their total 
monthly pay, a high percentage of the employees (76 percent) said they were incapable 
of saving any portion of their salaries, and as identified during the pilot testing phase of 
the questionnaire, their participation in ‘gameyat’ is for the purpose of making ends 
meet; they do not approve of calling it ‘savings’. 
 
On asking respondents whether the total monthly pay received covers their total needs, 
98 percent chose ‘disagree’, or ‘to a certain extent disagree’. Next, on asking them 
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whether the total monthly pay covers their basic needs, 83 percent said ‘disagree’, 44 
percent ‘to a certain extent disagree’, while only 17 percent stated ‘agree’ or ‘strongly 
agree’. Specifically, on asking them whether the total monthly pay they receive covers 
their needs for a balanced food diet for them and their family members, 80 percent 
‘disagreed’, or ‘to a certain extent disagreed’, while 20 percent only agreed or strongly 
agreed. 
 
On asking about the approximate distribution of total monthly pay among different 
expenditure items in their consumption basket, it appeared that on average respondents 
in both organizations spend 40.6 percent on food, 18.7 percent on child education 
(including private lessons), 11.1 percent on electricity, water and telephone bills, 11.2 
percent on medical treatment, 11 percent on transportation, only 3.4 percent on 
recreation and 4.1 percent on other sundry items. Examples of expenditure items 
classified as ‘sundry’ included: ‘emergencies’, ‘rent’, ‘social obligations’, and ‘personal 
requirements’. 
It should be noted, however, that this distribution of total monthly income among the 
different expenditure items does not mean that the monthly government income covers 
all their needs, but is just a reflection of expenditure priorities. 
 
Relationship between pay and work performance 
When respondents were asked if there is a current relationship between their perception 
of the insufficiency of income and their work performance, 33 percent said ‘strongly 
agree’, or ‘agree’, while 57 percent ‘to a certain extent disagree’, or ‘disagree’ and 10 
percent did not provide an answer to the question. 
 
As for the idea linking pay to performance in the government sector in the future, 58 
percent of respondents agreed that pay should be linked to performance, 16 percent said 
‘No’ straightaway, and 26 percent did not respond to that question. 
 
Availability of other sources of income 
On asking respondents if they have other sources of income, 39 percent said ‘yes’. For 
those who have other sources of income, 14.3 percent have another job, 41.3 percent 
receive assistance from family members, 19 percent own private properties and real 
estate, 14.3 percent receive loans, and 11.1 percent mentioned other sundry sources. 
 
On sorting responses to the ‘other sources of income’ question based on respondents’ 
gender, it appeared that males scored higher on having a second job (20.7 percent for 
men and 8.8 percent for women—mainly due to social culture prototypes and unpaid 
housework responsibilities), on ownership of private properties and real estate (24.1 
percent for men and 14.7 percent for women), and on having other sundry sources of 
income (13.8 percent for men and 8.8 percent for women). Conversely, women 
employees scored higher on receiving assistance from family members (50 percent for 
women and 31 percent for men) and on receiving loans (17.6 percent for women and 
10.3 percent for men). These gender discrepancies in other sources of income are in 
conformance with the generally more dependent role of women in society, whether 
working or non-working women. The percentage (39 percent) denoting the number of 
respondents having second jobs should be interpreted with caution. The percentage may 
be more than that as not all respondents may have felt safe enough, or willing enough to 
declare such information to the interviewers, lest they get themselves in unwarranted 
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troubles. According to Law No. 47 for 1978 concerning state civil employees, article 77, 
items 11 and 12, an employee should not combine his/her job with any other work that 
may undermine his/her performance of the job duties and he/she should not perform any 
paid work even during non-working hours except with permission from the concerned 
authorities. Although many employees infringe on the law or gain employers’ 
permission as per prime ministerial decree 115/1983, yet they are not all ready to reveal 
to interviewers that they do so most probably without the required permission. 
 
Because of the sensitivity of the issue of having a second job, many refused to specify 
what type of job and very few specified what type of sundry sources of income they 
had. The only examples for the types of sundry sources of income mentioned included: 
‘spouse’s pension’, ‘bank savings’, ‘spouse’s salary’, ‘private project’, ‘assistance from 
charitable people’, and ‘travel abroad’; while examples of second jobs included: 
‘construction supervisor’, ‘company employee’, and ‘factory owner’. 
 
On asking respondents about the approximate percentage of their total monthly pay 
from the government job to their total income from all sources, there were great 
variations in their responses. Fifty-five percent mentioned that the government pay 
represents a 100 percent of their total income, 16 percent mentioned that the 
government pay represents 70-90 percent of their total income, 22 percent mentioned 
that the government pay represents 40-60 percent of their total income, and 7 percent 
mentioned that the government pay represents only 20-30 percent of their total income. 
The average approximate percentage of total monthly pay for all respondents to income 
from all sources equaled 81 percent. 
 
On asking respondents about the approximate percentage of their total monthly pay 
from the government job to their total income from all sources, there were great 
variations in their responses. Fifty-five percent mentioned that the government pay 
represents a 100 percent of their total income, 16 percent mentioned that the 
government pay represents 70-90 percent of their total income, 22 percent mentioned 
that the government pay represents 40-60 percent of their total income, and 7 percent 
mentioned that the government pay represents only 20-30 percent of their total income. 
The average approximate percentage of total monthly pay for all respondents to income 
from all sources equaled 81 percent. 
 
The overall conclusion from these responses is that the government salary is neither 
sufficient nor satisfactory for employees to guarantee a decent living and motivate them 
to excel. Therefore, a large proportion of employees currently fill the gap between their 
basic needs and the rising prices through means other than their government job. 
 
Employees’ recommendations for reforming government pay 
Respondents were asked about general recommendations for reforming the pay system 
in government, and also their specific recommendations in relation to proposals for 
adjusting minimum wage, deciding on percentage of yearly increases in salaries and 
wages, implementing performance-related pay, and suggesting sources for funding 
wage increases. 
 
A content analysis of respondents’ opinions regarding proposals for adjusting minimum 
wage showed the following: 20 percent suggested that it should be set between LE 
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1000-2000, 24 percent suggested it should be between LE 2000-3000, 11 percent 
suggested it should be between LE 3000-4000, and 9 percent suggested it should be 
between LE 4000-5000. Other responses emphasized that pay should cover living needs 
(6 percent), it should be compatible with price increases (4 percent), should be increased 
(3 percent), should be compatible with international wage and salary rates (1 percent), 
or should be compatible with wages in the private sector (1 percent). Meanwhile, 21 
percent of those interviewed were apathetic. 
 
As for interviewees’ suggestions regarding the percent of annual increases in wages and 
salaries, 29 percent said it should be between 30-50 percent of basic salary and 10 
percent said the raise should be between 15-20 percent. Meanwhile, other suggestions 
were that it should be compatible with the purchasing power of the Egyptian pound, the 
increase in prices and the inflation rates (41 percent), it should be similar to the annual 
increase offered to employees in the banking sector and petroleum companies (3 
percent), or it should be compatible with the increase in international prices (1 percent). 
Sixteen percent of the interviewees skipped that question altogether. 
 
Possible sources of funding government pay increases 
Some respondents mentioned simply that ‘it is the government’s business to adjust 
government employee pay from whatever sources there may be.’ 
As for more rigorously-suggested sources of funding wage increases, respondents came up 
with a list of options that in their opinion could be utilized by the government to mobilize 
the needed resources to fund the required wage and salary increases. Despite the earlier 
reported reservation of the interviewees when discussing their financial affairs, in this 
section of the interview they were very insightful. Through content analysis and by 
virtue of the number of hits a specific funding suggestion was mentioned, the authors 
came up with the following order, using the exact wording of the respondents as much 
as possible: 
- Establishing national productive agricultural and industrial projects that generate 
real and sustainable income for the country (18.5 percent).  
- Combating corruption and theft, bringing an end to money smuggling operations 
and holding officials accountable (17.9 percent).  
- Imposing progressive taxes on businessmen and large capitalist owners (11.7 
percent).  
- Imposing taxes on owners of mansions, large plots of land, privately-owned 
planes, and on nightclub activities (10.5 percent).  
- Increasing exports and encouraging investment and tourism (7.4 percent).  
- Increasing Suez Canal passage fees (7.4 percent).  
- Reducing excessive government expenditures of officials (4.9 percent).  
- Imposing progressive taxes on monthly income above LE 5000 per month (3.7 
percent).  
- Preventing tax evasion (2.5 percent).  
- Imposing progressive taxes on companies and factories producing cigarettes, 
alcoholic drinks, use of mobile telephones and recreational goods (2.5 percent).  
- Accepting grants, assistance and donations whether from foreign agencies or 
from local businessmen (1.2 percent).  
- Imposing more taxes on the iron and cement factories (0.6 percent).  
- Printing money (0.6 percent).  
- Other suggestions include: reducing gaps between different classes in society, 
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controlling merchants’ greed, regulating monopolistic activities and markets, 
protecting the poor, curbing inflation, spreading a culture of rational 
consumption, stopping the practice of appointing consultants and contractual 
appointments for large sums of money, re-distributing incomes between various 
government organizations so as to avoid discrepancies in wage and salary levels, 
encouraging research for the purpose of performance improvement, and finally 
spreading a new culture of moral and ethical values that would help fight 
corruption. 
 
The general impression from these recommendations is that respondents are very much 
dissatisfied with the unequal distribution of wealth in society and wide income 
disparities in Egypt, and as a result the majority of their conclusions revolved along 
these themes; that there is a need for more equitable distribution of income and wealth 
through better taxation, less monopoly and less corruption overall. 
 
SUGGESTED SALARY STRUCTURE FOR CIVIL SERVANTS IN EGYPT 
Two methods could be used to determine the minimum wage level appropriate to the 
economic and social conditions in a certain country. Firstly, in most countries the 
minimum wage level represents about 25 percent of the average per capita GDP. In 
Egypt, per capita GDP is LE 12,050 per year; i.e., LE 1,004 per month. Therefore, the 
minimum wage level is about LE 251 per month. Secondly, the minimum wage level 
should not be less than the lower poverty line, so as to ensure that a worker and his/her 
dependents can get their basic food and non-food needs. The lower poverty line in 
Egypt is LE 1,429 per person per year; i.e., LE 119 per month (Helmy 2006, 2008). 
 
As the second option would not fulfill the basic requirements per individual, the 
minimum wage of LE 251 per month is adopted as a more plausible option. The average 
household size in Egypt is about 4.632 persons, the percentage of employed persons to 
household members is 0.3423 and the dependency ratio is 2.921 percent, hence the 
proposed minimum wage is LE 733.2 per month compared to the current minimum 
wage of LE 295.13 per month. This proposed minimum wage will help an individual 
and his/her dependents meet their basic needs. Based on the previous calculations, a 
new civil servants salary structure could be proposed as shown in columns 5 and 6 in 
Table 5. 
Four aspects have to be noted relating to the proposed salary structure. First, a salary 
grade-per-grade slope was revisited to address the originally flat and irrational slope that 
is apparent in column 3. Second, a salary grade-on-grade schedule was constructed on a 
trial and error basis with a higher grade not to exceed 10 folds the lowest salary grade, 
as an accepted international good practice (Abdel-Khalek, 2008). Third, since grade 3 
marks the starting employment grade for university graduates, it was decided to reflect a 
slope increment higher than that recommended for lower non-university degree 
employment grades (grades 6, 5 and 4). Fourth, lower salary bounds per grade were 
utilized in this instance implying a conservative approach. 
 
The proposed salary structure will increase the total government fiscal cost of wages by 
nearly 256 percent, which would require substantial government funding. This would 
further require additional funding to cover the corresponding pension burden. These 
added fiscal costs on an already burdened budget suggest that revising the salary 
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structure along the proposed line may not be feasible unless coupled with rightsizing 
and streamlining the bureaucracy per a medium- to long-term strategy as discussed in 
the following section. 
 
Two additional caveats have to be added. First, an important ILO study (ILO 2005) on 
36 developing countries has recognized that most of the countries adjusted salaries 
according to the cost of living (24 countries), GDP growth rates per capita (22 
countries), and basic needs of employees according to dependency ratios (or average 
household size), and this was used in 18 countries studied. Therefore, it is envisioned 
that based on our point of departure above (proposed salary structure), annual salary is 
to be automatically adjusted by adding an increment reflecting changes in cost of living 
and GDP growth per capita rates, which is rational and reflects per capita productivity 
in order for salaries not to be eroded and employees hold stake in productivity levels. 
 
Second, the proposed salary structure represents an approximation of figures and is 
focused on permanent civil servants within the state apparatus. However, a potential 
cutback in the wage bill is envisioned upon devolution of fiscal and administrative 
authorities to the largest wage-bill-consuming civil service categories, i.e., the 
application of decentralization over local administration, public economic and service 
authorities, representing two-thirds of the size of the state administrative body, reduces 
recourse to additional public funds and at the same time frees more fiscal resources for 
effective government outlays on central government employees. According to CAOA 
(2008b), in FY 2006/07 civil service employees in the local government were 
2,974,602, in the public economic authorities 342,765 and in the public service 
authorities 445,861, totaling 3,763,228 (out of a grand total of 5,578,930 employees) 
representing 68 percent. 
 
MIX OF STRATEGIES FOR PAY REFORM IN EGYPT 
Based on the previous analysis, five main critical strategic issues were identified that 
are relevant to the pay system reform of government employees in Egypt. For each of 
those issues, a number of alternative strategies are proposed. The authors are using here 
an adaptation of Bryson’s strategy change cycle as explained in Bryson (2004). 
Figure 1 is a simplified model showing that the pay problem should be perceived as part 
and parcel of civil service reform initiatives in Egypt. In deciding on any number of 
strategies to resolve the problem, there is a need to test them first for political 














International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 11  ·  Issue 3  ·  2010  ·  © International Public Management Network 
74 
 





Strategic Issue #1: How to make available the extra funding necessary for 
increasing government employees’ pay? 
 
- Cutting back on corruption at all levels through setting clear rules.  
- Better management of government assets and resources.  
- Reducing expenditure on armed forces (army and police) perks, especially the 
recreational social clubs, resorts and hotels.  
- Rationalizing top level government officials’ expenditures (ministers’ numerous 
luxury cars, and extravagant office furnishings).  
- Establishing a ceiling for total government pay (basic salary + allowances + 
bonuses + commissions + incentives + profit sharing) so that the highest total 
income does not surpass N times - ten times in many countries - the lowest total 
income for an employee in any part of the government service.  
- Re-stressing the fact that the revenues achieved in some of the government 
sectors, like the petroleum sector, Suez Canal, the Tax Authority, are general 
public monies and should be looked at in the form of percentage retention (say 
between 50-70 percent of annual revenues) with the residual transferred to the 
national budget.  
- Effectively enforcing the property tax laws so as to increase revenue collection 
from those who can afford to pay, together with a phased and announced plan 
for decentralization to local government to sustain local government employees’ 
pay.  
- Continued enhancement of general tax collection and more strict enforcement of 
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the tax laws especially on higher income groups.  
 
Strategic Issue #2: How to ‘right-size’ and decentralize the government civil 
service? 
 
- Offering early retirement schemes through donor funding (through direct budget 
support or other means).  
- Freezing new appointments to the government sector and not replacing 
employees leaving the organization through natural attrition except when there is 
a proven real need and upon concluding a study on real employee needs and the 
envisioned rational structure of the government based on core functions.  
- Transferring employees from organizations that are over-staffed to organizations 
that are under-staffed.  
- Retraining central government level staff based on a clear human resource 
management strategy after rationalizing ministries and affiliated agencies to core 
activities, and devolving local government to local bodies, and corporatizing, 
privatizing, and/or outsourcing from divested public economic and service 
authorities.  
- Offering unemployment insurance rather than secured employment in the 
government. 
- Using transformative training to build and upgrade skills of employees to enable 
transfer from surplus areas to deficit areas and strengthen the link between labor 
market needs, and education/training systems.  
- More reliance on contracting out of non-core government functions, such as    
transport, catering, cleaning, gardening, car repair, buildings ownership and 
maintenance services. 
- Utilizing temporary and part-time employees for some job categories where 
there is no real need to provide them with tenured appointment, and putting a 
stop to the practice of automatic change in employment status—from temporary 
to tenured—after a number of years as a result of political and social pressures.  
- Activating the private sector and attracting foreign direct investment to create 
more job opportunities for former government employees and for new comers to 
the job market, so that they do not seek government employment. 
- Providing unemployment compensation plus social and medical insurance for 
workers in the informal and private sector so that the government job loses its 
main attractiveness of ‘security and stability’ relative to the non-government 
jobs. 
- Offering bonds to displaced labor. Upon being offered a job opportunity through 
the government network with the private sector, the bond is surrendered to the 
employer, and the employee is guaranteed a job till bond maturity date, 3-5 
years renewable or based on performance. If the employee underperforms in the 
private sector, he/she is discharged yet collects the debt (bond) instrument to 
continue to generate a cash flow that would sustain a decent living. 
- Creating a government operated e-recruitment system to help place former 
government employees in private sector companies (for a nominal fee).  
- Establishing a government public private partnership (PPP) network to which 
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Strategic Issue #3: How to make the system of allowances more transparent and 
reduce wage discrepancies? 
 
- Development of a new electronic database to keep track of each government 
employee’s actual pay and benefits.  
- Consolidation of allowances into salaries. In the current system, allowances are 
consolidated every five years.  
- Setting a ceiling for total government pay and a fixed ratio between the lowest 
and highest government pay.  
- Re-thinking the parallel system of donor supported highly paid staff in technical 
offices and project implementation units (PIUs) so that policy formulation 
becomes part of government operations, and more institutionalized and 
transparent. PIUs play a vital role in initiating reform, but they are not 
sufficiently sustainable (El Baradei 2006). The ambiguity surrounding their 
existence in different government organizations and ministries in Egypt 
enhances the general negative public perception of the extent of discrepancies 
existing in government employees’ pay system.  
 
Strategic Issue # 4: How to reform the wage policy for government employees? 
 
- Develop a phased plan for modification of the salary schedule to reflect a decent 
living for government employees and announce it to the public at large.  
- Modify immediately the minimum wage to at least exceed national poverty line 
(LE 733.2 per month). The same goes for the other salary categories, using the 
proposed automatic annual pay adjustment formula, and for the other grades.  
- Periodically increase government pay in line with rising inflation, GDP growth 
rates and average household needs.  
- Allow for more active collective bargaining in setting salary scales to ensure a 
sustainable system for continuous adjustment.  
- Consider revisiting the social insurance system to include the unadded bonuses 
while introducing innovative voluntary systems using other country experiences. 
- Provide more career-path capacity-building efforts to government employees to 
increase their productivity.  
- Reduce unnecessary and unjustified discrepancies in government employees’ 
pay in different government organizations and sectors.  
 
Strategic Issue #5: How to establish a better link between pay and performance? 
 
- For the proposed link to gain acceptance, it is necessary to keep the basic salary 
constant and link the designated percentage of variable pay to performance.  
- Change employees’ performance appraisal system to a forced ranking system, 
disallowing the current practice of giving the majority of employees an excellent 
rating.  
- Develop real performance measures for both organizations and personnel and 
ensure their fair and just implementation.  
- Develop and use competency-based frameworks for evaluating employees’ 
performance.  
- Incentives should be tied to citizen satisfaction, especially in front-office 
organizational interfaces.  
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- Enforce self-evaluation, independent organizational capacity assessment and 
strategic planning on a rolling basis.  
- Develop a dual system to reward both team and individual performance.  
 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
There are diverse stakeholders’ objectives to consider when reforming the pay system 
for government employees. Reforming the pay system requires adopting a 
comprehensive vision toward civil service reform that would satisfy the complex needs 
and objectives of both employer and employees and that would lead to enhanced 
performance, efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness for Egyptian government 
bureaucracy. 
 
The proposed pay reform recommends adoption of a rational model that takes into 
consideration the political and social feasibility of application. Egypt should not 
continue resorting to crisis management approaches in resolving its government 
employees’ pay related problems. The qualitative interviews conducted with the 
government employees reveal and accentuate the high level of dissatisfaction and 
inappropriateness of the current pay system, and point to the urgency of the reform 
efforts proposed in this study. Moreover, international experiences with pay reform—
although encompassing a variety of techniques and policies— have guided the quest for 
pay reform by pointing out the necessity of the presence of an overall plan, the 
significance of adopting a comprehensive perspective, the need for building consensus 
for reform and having a strong political will for effecting the proposed reform. 
 
Thus, there is no one technical fix for the public pay system. Egypt must develop a clear 
strategy, including action plans. Political considerations in pay system reform are as 
important as economic considerations and should not be dealt with lightly. But any 
economically rational recommendation should pass through a political feasibility sieve. 
Pay reform is part and parcel of civil service reform and should not be considered as a 
stand-alone intervention. A strategic perspective toward pay system reform requires 
achieving a balance between different stakeholders’ needs and expectations; hence, 
consultations are a prerequisite for success. This cannot take place without initiating a 
social dialogue on the subject, securing popular engagement and ownership. A 
comprehensive and strategic civil service reform plan is needed irrespective of change 
in political assumptions, and it has to be backed by presidential engagement and 
effectuation. These types of reforms are long-term and may extend beyond the lifetime 
of governments and should not be undermined for this very reason. 
 
Regardless of the mix of options and mechanisms decided upon in implementing the 
reform of the civil service pay system, there are some general pre-requisites that need to 
be taken into consideration, namely: 
- continued support, sponsorship and commitment to reform at the highest 
political levels (preferably the President, either in partisan or non-partisan 
announcements) and active participation and involvement of various groups of 
stakeholders in the reform process;  
- adoption of a long-term vision and strategy for civil service reform with concrete 
quantifiable targets and measures of performance over phased, clear-cut time 
spans issued and binding by law;  
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- staged implementation of reforms, since it is not possible that all problems can 
be solved simultaneously;  
- launching structured awareness campaigns to support reform efforts;  
- evaluation and documentation of the learning opportunities generated upon 
implementation;  
- the establishment of a high-level civil service reform steering committee to be 
responsible for championing and coordinating civil service reform efforts;  
- full engagement of coordinated/pooled funding and technical support for swift 
implementation of cross-cutting, sweeping reforms over the largest sector of the 
nation to sustain development; and  
- parallel political reform allowing for greater levels of accountability and 
transparency in government operations.  
 
Currently, there is a great perceived need for implementing pay reform. The time is 
right and once sufficient political support is available, the vision for an effective pay 
system can be achieved. The pay system proposed is affordable, flexible and equitable 
in light of prevailing market prices. It is also easy to administer and enables employees 
to meet their living expenses, and therefore could lead to a more efficient, effective and 
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National for building & construction 986.501064.581159.501247.58
Tourism, cinema & housing 1319.501596.751610.332006.92
Marine & land transport 914.081033.421079.421218.25
Commerce 563.25586.33663.00805.75
Total (average per month) 937.331028.081123.501281.25
 





 Number of Civil Servants per 1000 Citizens in Selected Countries 
 
Country Egypt Japan Germany US UK France 
 
No. of civil servants per 
100 38 65 75 81 97 
 
1000 citizens  
       
 
Source: Quoted in El Baradei (2004). 
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Table 4:  
Sample Profile 
 
 Ministry of Trade & Central Agency for Total employees in  
 Industry  Organization  & both organizations  
   Administration   
 # of  % # of % # of employees Approximate % 
 employees   employees   in population* 
Respondents to interviews 50  
100
% 50 100% 100  
Employment status        
Tenured 45  90%47 94% 92 91.7% 
Temporary 5  10%3 6% 8 8.3% 
Job grade        
General manager 1  2% 6 12% 7 0.1% 
Senior researcher (with a 7  14%5 10% 12 4.6% 
rank of general manager)        
First grade 6  12%22 44% 28 19.6% 
Second grade 25  50%3 6% 28 25.4% 
Third grade 6  12%11 22% 17 42% 
Contractual employment 5  10%3 6% 8 8.3% 
Gender        
Male 29  58%22 44% 51  
Female 21  42%28 56% 49  
Age group        
21<30 4  8% 5 10% 9  
30 <40 17  34%8 16% 25  
40<50 14  28%15 30% 29  
50<60 15  30%22 44% 37  
60 or more 0  0 0 0 0  
# of work years        
<5years 1  2% 4 8% 5  
5<10 11  22%5 10% 16  
10<20 20  40%11 22% 31  
20<30 14  28%25 50% 39  
30 or more 4  8% 5 10% 9  
Social status        
Single 6  12%7 14% 13  
Married 39  78%43 86% 82  
Divorced 1  2% 0 0 1  
Widowed 4  8% 0 0 4  
# of dependents        
1 5  10%0 0 5  
2 15  30%11 22% 26  
3 12  24%7 14% 19  
4 4  8% 7 14% 11  
5 7  14%3 6% 10  
6 0  0 2 4% 2  
7 or more 0  0 1 2% 1  
None 7  14%19 38% 26  
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations; Ministry of Finance, Statistical Volume for State Budget 2007/2008, 
quoted in El Gebali (2008, 21). 
 
* Population of government employees used = 5,264,681 (tenured employees) + 300,000 (contractual 
employees) – 846,156 (supporting staff on grades 4, 5 and 6) – 1,039,592 (special cadres and unspecified 
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 Proposed Civil Servants Salary Structure 
 
Grade No. ofCurrent%Average salary Proposed salary% Revised salary
 employees*salaryincreasebill per month structureincrease bill per month
 structure perper grade(000s LE) (min. wage = LEper (000s LE)
 month** 733.2/m)grade 
 (LE)  
 (1)(2)(3)(4) = (1) * (2) (5)(6) (7) = (5) * (1)
       
1st  US 3261,389.351.6452.9 7,007.145.8 2,284.3
       
US 1,734916.510.81,589.2 4,805.043.0 8,331.8
GM 254,851826.827.7210,710.8 3,360.140.0 856,331.0
       
G-1 787,084647.530.0509,636.9 2,400.137.1 1,889,071.5
       
G-2 1,000,097498.235.8498,248.3 1,750.134.6 1,750,271.0
       
G-3 1,696,949366.819.5622,440.9 1,300.030.0 2,206,085.6
G-4 459,681307.04.0141,122.1 1,000.017.7 459,691.8
       
G-5 275,241295.12.181,223.6 850.015.9 233,954.5
       
G-6 188,200289.0-54,389.8 733.2- 137,988.2
       
Total   2,119,814.5   7,544,009.8
salary       
burden       
per       
month        
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Structured Interview Instrument 
 
REFORMING THE PAY SYSTEM FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN EGYPT 
 
 
First: Administrative Questions: 
 
Kindly place a √ mark in front of the correct answer: 
 
1. Current Employment Status:  
     Permanent  
     Temporary  
 
2. Job Grade: (First, Second, ….): ……………………………………………. 
 
3. Gender: 
     Male   
     Female   
 
4. Age: 
     21 - < 30 years 
     30 - < 40 years 
     40 - < 50 years 
     50 - < 60 years 
     60 years or more 
 
5. Number of Work Years: 
     Less than five years 
     From 5 - < 10 years 
     From 10 - < 20 years 
     From 20 - < 30 years 
     30 years or more 
 
6. Social Status: 
 
     Bachelor 
     Married 
     Divorced 
     Widowed 
 
7. Number of dependents for whom I am responsible: --------------------------------------- 
 
 
8. Why did you choose to work in a government organization? (It is possible to mention more than one reason) 
 
 Sense of Security & Stability 
 Less Work Load 
 Better Working Hours 
 Proximity to Place of Residence 
 Absence of Commitments 
 Prestige and Social Status 
 Lack of Responsibility or Accountability 
 Possibility for taking on a second job 
 Possibility for Promotion 
 Suitability of My Educational Degree to Current job 
 Wages, incentives and benefits 




Second: Satisfaction with Total Pay: 
 
 (By total pay is meant the average amount of pay received monthly including: 
 basic salary + incentives + bonuses + allowances) 
 
Kindly place a √ mark in front of the correct answer: 
 
9. Are you satisfied with the total pay you receive from your government job on a monthly basis? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
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10. Is the monthly total pay you receive compatible with the market value of wages/salaries? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
11. Are incentives and bonuses distributed according to clear and well determined criteria? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
12. Are incentives distributed with a great degree of fairness? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
13. Are yearly bonuses and salary increases compatible with the inflation rates and the increase in prices? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
14. Are you satisfied with the latest social increase to wages stipulated in May 2008? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
15. Can you save a portion of your total monthly pay? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
16. Do you sometimes participate in ‘gamaiat’ (informal saving groups) as a way to secure cost of living requirements? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
17. Does the total monthly pay cover all your needs? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
18. Does the total monthly pay you receive cover all your basic needs? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
19. Does the total monthly pay you receive cover your needs for a balanced food diet for you and your family members? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
20. Does the insufficiency of income relative to your living requirements affect your work performance? 
   Strongly Agree   Agree   To A Certain Extent Disagree   Disagree 
 
21. My expenditure on different items from my total monthly pay in approximate percentages is as follows: 
• ----------% Food 
• ----------% Children Education (Including private lessons) 
• ----------% Electricity, Water and telephone bills 
• ----------% Medical Expenses 
• ----------% Transportation Expenses 
• ----------% Recreation 
• ----------% Other: Please Specify:------------------ 
_______________ 
  100% 
 
22. If your monthly total pay does not cover all your needs, than do you have other sources of income? 
 YES    NO 
 
23. If there are other sources of income, these are: (you can check more than one source) 
 
 A result of additional work – Please specify nature of work:------------- 
 Assistance from family members 
 Private properties and real estate 
 Loans 
 Other sources of income – Please specify:----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
24. What is the percentage of your total monthly pay from the government job (Basic salary + incentives + bonuses + 
allowances) to your total income from all sources?        -----------------% 
 
25. What are your recommendations for reforming the pay system in consideration of the following issues? 
• Minimum Wage :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
• % of Yearly Increase: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
• Performance Related Pay:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
• Suggested Sources for funding Wage Increases:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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